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Abstract
This paper examines how the pass-through of monetary policy measures in 6
EMU countries has evolved over time and whether there is convergence in
monetary transmission. The countries included are: Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, and the sample period is 1980-
2000. We conclude that major differences in pass-through exist in our
sample, both in terms of initial as well as long-run responses to policy-
induced interest rate changes. There is no indication for convergence of
monetary policy transmission.
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st, 1999 Europe entered a new era with the adoption of a single currency
– the euro – by 11 of the European Union’s 15 member states. For the first time since
the Roman Empire, a large portion of Europe again shares a common currency.
1 The
launch of the euro has created the world’s second largest single currency area in terms
of economic size after the Unites States. The euro area accounts for some 15 per cent
of global GDP (Eijffinger and De Haan, 2000).
With the start of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), participating
countries no longer have their own monetary policy. The European Central Bank
(ECB) is responsible for monetary policy decisions in the euro zone. Amongst other
things, the impact of monetary policy on the real economy depends on how changes
in policy rates are transmitted to market interest rates. Two elements are crucial for
the transmission of monetary policy decisions: the speed and the degree to which
changes in the policy rate affect the cost of borrowing. A well-known study by
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) on the pass-through of monetary policy measures
concludes that the degree of stickiness of market rates in the eurozone countries is, on
average, quite high and shows considerable variation, especially in the short run. Also
in the long run sometimes substantial differences show up.
Although the EMU countries now share the same currency, their financial
systems showed considerable differences. A number of authors have argued that this
may complicate the implementation of a single monetary policy (see e.g. Dornbusch
et al., 1998). Although many features of the financial structure may be endogenous to
the monetary policy regime, some may adjust more slowly (or perhaps not at all). As
pointed out by Mojon (2000), national segmentation in the retail banking industry
may remain significant in spite of EMU as retail banking involves heavy investments
in brand names, in a network of branches and in relationships with customers. Also
differences in regulation may cause retail banking markets to remain segmented along
national lines. Furthermore, differences in the balance sheet structure of households
and firms will only gradually adjust to the new monetary regime. As a consequence,
                                                
1 At the time of writing, three EU member states do not (yet) participate in EMU: Denmark, the United
Kingdom and Sweden (Greece participates in the EMU since 2001). Still, it is expected that at some
time these countries will also use the euro, as will some potential future EU member countries in
Central and Eastern Europe.3
the pass-through from policy-controlled interest rates to bank interest rates may
remain country specific. This potential source of asymmetry in monetary transmission
is particularly relevant in the euro area where bank rates are a key determinant of the
cost of capital and the yield on savings.
Following the approach of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) this paper examines
how the pass-through of monetary policy measures in the six largest EMU countries
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain) has evolved over time
and whether there is convergence in monetary transmission. Of course, it can be
argued that the start of EMU implies a regime shift and that, therefore, the Lucas
critique applies. However, as Issing (2001, p. 290) points out: "One should realise
that, first, a long and gradual process of monetary convergence has preceded the
introduction of the new currency, so that many of the adjustments may already have
taken place. Second, the effect of the single currency on competition in goods, labour,
and financial markets follows previous structural changes such as the Single Market
Initiative, so that whatever structural change will take place is part of an on-going
process." We test whether this hypothesis is true for the pass-through of policy-
controlled interest rates to bank rates. The countries in our sample cover most of the
euro zone. Our estimation period is 1980-2000. We conclude that differences in pass-
through exist in our sample, both in terms of initial as well as long-run responses to
policy-induced interest rate changes. There is no indication for convergence of
monetary policy transmission.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a brief
review of the literature. Section 3 presents our model and the data, while sections 4
and 5 contain our results. The final section offers some concluding comments.
2.  Review of the literature
Lowe and Rohling (1992) point out that many of the explanations advanced to explain
price stickiness in goods markets are also applicable to financial markets. Following
their approach, we may distinguish four theories: agency costs (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981), adjustment costs (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994), switching costs (Klemperer,
1987), and risk sharing (Fried and Howitt, 1980).4
Agency costs arise due to asymmetric information. Banks cannot distinguish
between risky and less risky projects. Consequently, an increase in the costs of
funding will not necessarily result in a proportionate increase in the loan rate of
banks. When the bank increases its loan rate, the firms with the safest projects will be
the first to withdraw from the markets. As a result, the mix of applicants applying for
loans changes adversely (adverse selection). Furthermore, firms may decide to
undertake riskier projects due to the higher interest rates (moral hazard). As the
probability of default due to the higher interest rate would rise, an increase in the loan
rate will not necessarily result in a proportionate increase in the bank's expected
receipts. Banks may therefore prefer to set the loan rate below the market clearing rate
and ration credit.
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) argue that the banking industry faces
adjustment costs when interest rates change. A profit-maximising bank will only
change the lending rate if the adjustment costs are lower than the costs of keeping
lending rates unchanged. The cost of maintaining non-equilibrium rates is positively
related to the elasticity of the demand for bank loans. The demand for bank loans is
less elastic in markets that have fewer competitors, higher barriers to entry or no
alternative sources of finance, including foreign capital. Finally, banks will not adjust
their lending rates if they perceive that the changes in the money market rates are only
temporary.
Banks are concerned with the characteristics of their clients, like risk profile.
Unlike many other markets, one client is not as good as the other. To find out about
the characteristics of clients is a costly activity for a bank, which is often passed on to
the client in the form of a fee, which makes it costly for a buyer to switch from one
bank to another (switching costs). As shown by Klemperer (1987), switching costs
cause the derivative of price with respect to marginal cost to be less than one (Lowe
and Rohling, 1992).
Finally, risk sharing may explain interest rate stickiness. Fried and Howitt
(1980) argue that borrowers may be more risk averse than the shareholders of a bank.
As the borrower is risk averse, he prefers stable interest rate payments. The bank
therefore charges a less variable interest rate than its marginal cost of funds for which
it is compensated by a higher interest rate (risk premium).5
A few studies have investigated the pass-through empirically in a multi-country
setting. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) report important differences in pass-through in
various countries. Table 1 shows the short-term (i.e. one-month) effect for the six
countries which are focused upon in the present study. Also the outcomes of similar
studies by Borio and Fritz (1995) and BIS (1994) are presented in this table.
Table 1. Short-run and long-run  effect of policy rate increase of 100 basispoints
on lending rate (basispoints)



























BIS (1994) 85 18 - 43 14 125
Note: the first row shows the short-run effect, the second presents the long-run effect. The BIS study
only reports initial multipliers.
Mojon (2000) examined the pass-through in the same six EMU countries as the
present paper for the period 1979-1998 for a whole range of deposit and credit rates
(which can, however, not be fully compared across countries) and confirms the
conclusion of heterogeneity of previous studies. Finally, Sander and Kleimeier (2001)
provide evidence that the speed of adjustment and the nature of the adjustment
process itself differ in the EMU countries.
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) have also examined whether differences in
pass-through are related to diverging financial structures. They obtain a significant
negative effect of five financial structure variables on the pass-through: the absence of
a money market for negotiable short-term instruments, the volatility of the money
market rate, constraints on international capital movements, the existence of barriers
to entry and the public ownership of the banking system.
Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mojon (2000) has estimated the
impact of financial structure on the pass-through within a panel of 25 credit market
rates and 17 deposit rates in the six biggest EMU countries. He finds that for both
credit and deposit rates the volatility of the money market rate reduces the pass-
through and that competition from direct finance increases it.6
Some studies report evidence on interest rate stickiness for just one country. For
instance, Lowe and Rohling (1992) find large differences in pass-through in Australia
across different types of loans. They report complete pass-through of changes in
banks' marginal costs of funds only for overdraft rates to business borrowers. For
credit cards, personal loans, mortgages, and the standard overdraft rate, changes in the
banks' marginal costs of funds have not been translated one for one. This result
underlines that in analyses involving various countries one has to be very careful to
use as much as possible comparable interest rates.
Cottarelli et al. (1995) conclude that differences in the degree of lending rate
stickiness among Italian banks are to a large extent due to differences in concentration
of the local markets in which banks operate. Other relevant factors are: the extent of
securitisation of banks' liabilities, the form of the loan, bank size and the banks'
ownership structure.
In the following sections we will build upon the method of Cottarelli and Kourelis
(1994) to examine whether the pass-through of monetary policy measures has
changed over time. In Section 5 we will employ an error-correction model for this
purpose.
3. The Cottarelli-Kourelis model and the data
We have first estimated a similar model as Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) to analyse
the speed and the degree to which interest rates react to changes in policy-determined
rates. The estimated model is:
t n t n t t t u m m i i + + + + + = − + − 2 2 1 1 0 .... β β β β (1)
where it denotes either the lending rate or the capital market rate in month t; mt is the
money market rate and ut is an error term. As noted by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994),
this specification and the resulting steady state solution is consistent with a
monopolistic competition model relating the loan rate to the money market rate (i.e. to7
the exogenously given marginal costs of funds). The model is, of course, a
simplification as the lending (and capital market) rate is also influenced by shifts in
the demand for loans, changes in the perceived riskiness of  loans, and perhaps by the
business cycle. However, to make our results comparable to those of Cottarelli and
Kourelis (1994), we start with this simple model.
On the basis of equation (1), the following three multipliers can be calculated:
2
•   The impact multiplier:  2 0 β = h
•   The interim multiplier:  ∑ = + − + =
) , min(
0 2 1 1
n k
i i k k h h β β
•   The long-term multiplier:  ∑ = + −
=
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The idea behind the model is that the money market rate is determined by
monetary policy. The money market rate used refers to the three-month inter-bank
rate in the various countries.
3 As the study of the BIS (1994) shows that the response
of the three months money market rate to the official monetary policy rate is nearly
one for one, we use this interest rate as proxy for the policy-determined interest rate
(see also Sander and Kleimeier, 2001). For the observations after the start of EMU the
three month euro inter-bank market rate has been used. The data for the lending rate
(short-term loans to enterprises) have been provided by the ECB, except for Italy
where we have used the lending rate as published in the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, because the ECB data set started only in 1989.
4 We have
also used the T-bill rate for Italy, because according to Cottarelli et al. (1995, p. 693),
lending on the Italian inter-bank market was limited before the 1990s, and the T-bill
rate was the relevant reference rate then. As proxy for the capital market rate we have
employed the government bond yield as published in the IFS, except for France, for
which we have used data from Datastream. The model is estimated using monthly
data and the estimation period is 1980.1-2000.1.
5 The sample covers two complete
interest rate cycles.
Table 2 summarises our data set and provides the correlation between (the
level and the first differences of) the money market rate with the lending rate and the
                                                
2 See Stewart and Venieris (1978) for details.
3 Data have kindly been provided by Jan Kakes of the Dutch central bank.
4 This is one of the differences with the study of Mojon (2000) who employed a whole range of interest
rates, which lack comparability. Furthermore, in contrast to Mojon (2000), we focus on changes in
pass-through over time.
5 For the lending rate the periods are 1983:8-1999:11 for Italy and 1984:4-2000:1 for France.8
capital market rate, as well as the average and the standard deviation of the spread
between the money market rate and the lending and capital market rate, respectively.
Table 2. A summary of the data
Correlations Spread Money market
rate versus … Levels First diff. Average St. deviation
Lending rate
Belgium 0.97 0.82 3.11 0.68
Germany 0.83 0.50 2.95 1.19
Spain 0.99 0.85 1.03 0.49
France 0.93 0.08 1.83 1.04
Italy 0.97 0.38 2.69 1.05
Netherlands 0.99 0.70 0.34 0.30
Capital
market rate
Belgium 0.93 0.32 0.60 1.58
Germany 0.90 0.52 0.74 1.34
Spain 0.94 0.46 -0.19 1.67
France 0.93 0.51 0.69 1.31
Italy 0.94 0.41 -0.19 1.63
Netherlands 0.86 0.57 1.14 1.39
4.  Results for the Cottarelli-Kourelis model
The first step in our analysis was to examine whether the model had to be estimated in
levels or first differences.
6 As the ADF tests clearly indicated that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the interest rates are I(1), the model is estimated in first differences.
The second step is the selection of the number of lags to be included. We have used
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) criterion to determine the lag structure. Table 3
presents the various multipliers for the lending rate. It clearly follows that there are
substantial differences across countries with respect to both the initial effect of
monetary policy and the long-term effect of policy-induced interest rate changes.
                                                
6 Cottareli and Kourelis (1994) also report first difference estimates.9
Table 3. Multipliers (lending rate)
Country Lags h0
* h3 h6 h12 hL
*
Belgium 12 0.752 (0.033) 0.755 0.923 1.039 1.018 (0.085)
Germany 8 0.330 (0.029) 0.719 0.801 0.899 0.899 (0.056)
Spain 8 0.898 (0.031) 1.033 1.117 1.135 1.135 (0.054)
France 10 0.075 (0.053) 0.526 0.664 0.618 0.618 (0.132)
Italy
(interbank)
2 0.175 (0.036) 0.614 0.616 0.616 0.616 (0.061)
Italy (T-bill) 3 0.182 (0.037) 0.722 0.733 0.733 0.733 (0.079)
Netherlands 5 0.847 (0.048) 0.841 0.958 0.965 0.965 (0.056)
* Standard errors in parentheses.
Our findings differ from the results of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). For Belgium,
the Netherlands and Spain we find substantially higher initial impact (h0) multipliers.
The short-run results for Germany and Italy are very similar in both studies, while
France is not included by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). For the  long-run multipliers
we find for Germany and Italy lower values than Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994).
Table 4 shows the outcomes if we estimate the model using capital market
rates instead of lending rates. The differences across countries are less pronounced
than in Table 3. Still, both initial and long-run effect differ.
Table 4. Multipliers (government bond yield)
Country Lags h0
* h3 h6 h12 hL
*
Belgium 2 0.134 (0.034) 0.138 0.137 0.137 0.137 (0.054)
Germany 1 0.320 (0.042) 0.273 0.271 0.271 0.271 (0.071)
Spain 4 0.272 (0.033) 0.372 0.472 0.475 0.475 (0.078)
France 8 0.254 (0.032) 0.325 0.343 0.416 0.416 (0.107)
Italy
(interbank)
5 0.314 (0.047) 0.393 0.581 0.589 0.589 (0.129)
Italy (T-bill) 7 0.319 (0.042) 0.573 0.681 0.821 0.821 (0.126)
Netherlands 1 0.423 (0.039) 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.466 (0.062)
* Standard errors in parentheses.
As explained in Section 1, the purpose of this paper is not so much to determine
whether monetary transmission differs across EMU countries, but whether there is
convergence of monetary transmission. For this purpose we have employed rolling
regressions. The idea behind this approach is to take a fixed number of observations
and to redo the regressions, every time adding one observation at the end of the10
sample, while dropping one at the beginning. The results should indicate whether the
monetary policy transmission has been stable over time. The upper part of Figures 1-6
show the impact and long-run multipliers for the lending rate (plus and minus two
standard errors)
7, using for every regression a period of 48 months and the same
number of lags as reported in table 3. The lower part of the figures shows the
intermediate multipliers. The dotted lines indicate the estimated multiplier values for
the full sample period. Although in some countries the multipliers change somewhat
over time, there is no clear trend towards convergence. The same conclusion holds for
the government bond yield multipliers (not shown).
8
[insert figures 1-6 here]
5. Error correction model
So far, we have updated and extended the analysis of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994).
The advantage of following this study is that our results are directly comparable with
those of Cottareli and Kourelis (1994). However, the model of Cottarelli and Kourelis
(1994) can be improved upon by using cointegration techniques. The underlying idea
of cointegration is that non-stationary time series (such as interest rates) can move
apart in the short run, but will be brought back to an equilibrium relation in the long
run. If variables are cointegrated, their relationship can be modelled by using an Error
Correction Model (ECM).
9 In this section we report our results for this alternative
approach, while following as closely as possible the method followed in the previous
section.
10
                                                
7  For the impact multiplier, the variance is straightforward and (omitting hats) given by
) var( ) var( 2 0 β = h . For the long-term multiplier, we have (asymptotically)  ' ) var( g g hl Σ =  where g
denotes the gradient of the long-term multiplier (i.e. the vector of derivatives of  ) (β l l h h = ), and Σ  is



























(assuming 1 1 ≠ β , which seems to be the case in our estimation).
8 Results available on request.
9 See also Kleimeier and Sander (2000), Mojon (2000) and Sander and Kleimeier (2001).
10 For this purpose we have to use a somewhat different model than Cottarelli and Kourelis as in the
RHS of eq. (1) we need a term  0    ,  
*
1
* ≠ − β β t i . In the model of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994),11














j t j t
u m i m i c
u e m i c i
+ − + ∆ + ∆ + =






















δ λ β α
λ β α
(2)
where  t e  denote the residuals of the long-run (cointegration) equation; δ ˆ is the
estimated long-run parameter. The idea is first to test for cointegration and then to
estimate this model and apply rolling regressions to examine whether there is
evidence for convergence of monetary transmission in our sample of EMU countries.
As pointed out, we first have to test whether the interest rates are cointegrated.
It turned out that for all samples as used in the rolling regressions the variables are
clearly cointegrated. Consequently, we could employ the ECM as described in
equation (2).  In order to make the results in this section as comparable as possible
with the results in the previous section - and thus with Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) -
we have decided to report the rolling regression results for j max = 1 (and
12 max = k ).
11 As in the previous section, the optimal lag structure for  t m ∆  is
determined using AIC for the full estimation period.
12 We focus on the following
parameters:
•   0 β : which is comparable with  0 h in the previous section (B0 in figures 7-12);
•   δ ˆ: indicates the long-run equilibrium relationship between both interest rates,
which is comparable with  l h  (denoted by DH in figures 7-12);
•   λ : shows the adjustment speed (denoted by LB in figures 7-12).
The rolling regressions of the  ECM have been done with 60 and 84 months. We only
report the results for the 7 year period (the results for the 5 year period are very
similar and are available on request). The lower part of figures 7 to 12 present the
outcomes of the cointegration test.
                                                                                                                                           
0
* ≡ β . In other words,  t i ∆  does not react to a difference from the equilibrium value in the previous
period so that an ECM-model is not possible.
11 We have also done the rolling regressions using  6 max max = = k j . The conclusions are not
sensitive to this alternative specification (results available on request).
12 The following lags were used: BE 1; DE 9; ES 3; FR 11; IT 3; NL 3.12
[insert figures 7-12 here]
Also figures 7-12 do not provide support for convergence of monetary transmission.
There are substantial differences across the EMU countries in terms of all the
parameters of the ECM. There is no clear sign that over time these differences have
become less. Those countries that have below (above) EMU average values for the
parameters of the ECM do not consistently show a downward (upward) trend. Again,
the same basic conclusion was found when rolling regressions were used for the
model with the government bond yield (results available on request).
6. Concluding comments
In this paper we have examined how the pass-through of monetary policy measures in
6 EMU countries has evolved over time and whether there is convergence in
monetary transmission. The countries included are: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain and the sample period is 1980-2000. We conclude that
major differences in pass-through exist in our sample, both for the initial and the long-
run responses to policy-induced interest rate changes. There is no indication for
convergence of monetary policy transmission. Given the convergence in other areas
that has occurred during this period, this is quite a remarkable finding. Our results
also suggest that it is unlikely that convergence in monetary transmission will take
place in the near future, as there are no indications that since the start of EMU
convergence has started. Our results imply that ECB policy decisions affect interest
rates in the countries in the euro area differently, thereby complicating the
implementation of a single monetary policy.13
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Figure 1: Multipliers in the Cottareli-Kourelis model: Belgium
BE-dif
H0

















































The horizontal dotted lines show the estimated values for the full sample period.16
Figure 2: Multipliers in the Cottareli-Kourelis model: Germany
DE-dif
H0




















































The horizontal dotted lines show the estimated values for the full sample period.17
Figure 3: Multipliers in the Cottareli-Kourelis model: Spain
ES-dif
H0

















































The horizontal dotted lines show the estimated values for the full sample period.18
Figure 4: Multipliers in the Cottareli-Kourelis model: France
FR-dif
H0






















































The horizontal dotted lines show the estimated values for the full sample period.19
Figure 5: Multipliers in the Cottareli-Kourelis model: Italy
IT-dif
H0

















































The horizontal dotted lines show the estimated values for the full sample period.20
Figure 6: Multipliers in the Cottareli-Kourelis model: Netherlands
NL-dif
H0














































The horizontal dotted lines show the estimated values for the full sample period.21
Figure 7: Parameters of the ECM model
Belgium
B0







































The horizontal dotted lines in the upper three figures show the estimated values for
the full sample period. The lower graph - labelled "Coint" - shows the results of
Engle-Granger cointegratoin tests. The three upper dotted lines in that graph depict
the 1, 5, and 10 percent "exact" critical values from the response surface regression in
MacKinnon (1991).22
Figure 8: Parameters of the ECM model
Germany
B0













































The horizontal dotted lines in the upper three figures show the estimated values for
the full sample period. The lower graph - labelled "Coint" - shows the results of
Engle-Granger cointegratoin tests. The three upper dotted lines in that graph depict
the 1, 5, and 10 percent "exact" critical values from the response surface regression in
MacKinnon (1991).23
Figure 9: Parameters of the ECM model
Spain
B0










































The horizontal dotted lines in the upper three figures show the estimated values for
the full sample period. The lower graph - labelled "Coint" - shows the results of
Engle-Granger cointegratoin tests. The three upper dotted lines in that graph depict
the 1, 5, and 10 percent "exact" critical values from the response surface regression in
MacKinnon (1991).24
Figure 10: Parameters of the ECM model
France
B0


































The horizontal dotted lines in the upper three figures show the estimated values for
the full sample period. The lower graph - labelled "Coint" - shows the results of
Engle-Granger cointegratoin tests. The three upper dotted lines in that graph depict
the 1, 5, and 10 percent "exact" critical values from the response surface regression in
MacKinnon (1991).25
Figure 11: Parameters of the ECM model
Italy
B0











































The horizontal dotted lines in the upper three figures show the estimated values for
the full sample period. The lower graph - labelled "Coint" - shows the results of
Engle-Granger cointegratoin tests. The three upper dotted lines in that graph depict
the 1, 5, and 10 percent "exact" critical values from the response surface regression in
MacKinnon (1991).26
Figure 12: Parameters of the ECM model
The Netherlands
B0










































The horizontal dotted lines in the upper three figures show the estimated values for
the full sample period. The lower graph - labelled "Coint" - shows the results of
Engle-Granger cointegratoin tests. The three upper dotted lines in that graph depict
the 1, 5, and 10 percent "exact" critical values from the response surface regression in
MacKinnon (1991).